# The Mandate Needed a Human: Singapore's Agent Registry, Looking Back From 2036 > In 2026 Singapore's Parliament asked who answers for an AI agent, and settled on a principle: behind every agent there must always be a human who does. Ten years on, the principle holds. It is held, four or five chimes an hour, by a sixty-one-year-old former lorry driver with two hundred and forty mandates in his name. - Publication: What If? Magazine - Correspondent: Caelus Ward - Vertical: Communications - Published: 2026-11-14 - Reading time: 9 min - Tags: digital-identity, ai-agents, singapore, singpass, accountability - Canonical URL: https://www.whatifmag.com/blog/the-mandate-needed-a-human What If? Magazine publishes speculative journalism written from a 2036 vantage. The reporting and sources are real; the 2036 framing is a deliberate editorial device, not a claim about the present. --- The chime is the job. Faizal Omar hears it four or five times an hour, a soft double note from a secondhand phone propped against the napkin holder at his table in a MacPherson coffee shop. Each chime is an agent asking for a human. He reads the mandate, three lines long, always roughly the same shape: what the agent may buy, from whom, up to what ceiling. He taps once. The agent goes off to book a container slot or settle a supplier invoice or negotiate a delivery window with another agent, and Faizal's name sits behind it in the registry as the accountable natural person for whatever it does next. He is sixty-one. He drove a lorry for thirty years. This morning he holds two hundred and forty mandates. Nobody in Parliament was describing this job when they invented it. ![A macro view of the clouded, lifting corner of a heavily scratched laminated identity card on worn melamine.](https://www.whatifmag.com/images/articles/the-mandate-needed-a-human/the-mandate-needed-a-human--fig1.png) **Figure 1.** A mandate holder's card, ten years into the work, 2036. The idea arrived on a Wednesday in November 2026, in an adjournment motion tabled by Tin Pei Ling, the member for Marine Parade-Braddell Heights. She proposed that the government consider building a national digital identity infrastructure for AI agents: an open, trusted registry against which any party could check an agent's identity and what it was authorised to do. Akin to Singpass, she said, but for AI agents.[^1][^2] Answering her was Jasmin Lau, Senior Minister of State for Digital Development and Information, who was also Acting Minister for Manpower and the minister in charge of GovTech.[^3] Confidence in agents, she said, rested on three questions: who the agent is, what it is authorised to do, and who is accountable for its actions.[^1] Then she said the thing that outlived the sitting. "Agents can act for us, but they cannot answer for us. Our task is to make sure that behind every agent, there is always someone who does."[^1] It is a good sentence. It is still true. Faizal is what it looks like from underneath. ## The promise, and what was actually built What the government did not do that day was commit to a registry. Lau supported the objectives and wanted agents to operate securely across platforms and organisations without separate walled gardens, but the registry itself stayed an open question. "This will inform our assessment of whether additional common infrastructure, including a national registry, is needed," she told the House.[^2][^4] The method was deliberate and, read now, almost modest: "Our approach is therefore to work with industry to find out what works in practice, build on existing infrastructure and emerging international standards, and step in with common standards or infrastructure where there are gaps that industry cannot fill on its own."[^2] The existing infrastructure was already being tested in strange directions. IMDA was working with GoDaddy, Infoblox, Cloudflare and Google to explore whether the internet's Domain Name System, the address book that turns names into machines, could be adapted to identify and verify agents across platforms.[^1] GovTech was building an internal registry recording who owns each agent and what it does, aimed at around 150,000 public officers through its AI Assistant Desk suite, piloting before a wider rollout. Its chief executive, Goh Wei Boon, wanted "a layer of customisable rules, sanctioned AI tools and a registry to provide better visibility and security." Agents were blocked from deleting files and from emailing external recipients.[^5] The Monetary Authority of Singapore was developing Safeguards for Agentic Finance at Runtime, to [verify an agent's identity and authority before a transaction cleared](https://www.whatifmag.com/blog/the-counter-left-the-bank) and keep an auditable record of what it did.[^1] In the private lane, Visa's Trusted Agent Protocol and [Google's Agent Payments Protocol](https://www.whatifmag.com/blog/the-economy-that-never-sleeps) were doing the same work for checkouts.[^4] Over all of it sat IMDA's Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI, launched at the World Economic Forum in January 2026 and updated that May, guidance rather than statute, insisting throughout that humans remain ultimately accountable.[^6][^7] Question one and question two got engineering. Keys, tokens, protocols, a domain name repurposed as a passport. Question three got a sentence. ## Identity scales. Accountability does not. An identity can be derived from a key. An authority can be written into a token and expired on a timer. Accountability needs somebody who can be summoned, fined, barred, or caned, and you cannot mint more of those. Singapore had already run this experiment on humans. By 2022 Singpass reached more than 4.5 million users, roughly 97 percent of citizens and permanent residents aged fifteen and above, carrying more than 350 million personal and corporate transactions a year across more than 2,000 services from over 700 organisations.[^8] It worked because it was everywhere. Because it was everywhere, it was worth stealing, and then it was worth renting. The police record for 2025 says so plainly. There were 37,308 scam cases that year, with losses of about $913.1 million, down from about $1,112.4 million the year before.[^9] Underneath that improvement sat a labour market in borrowed legal identity. More than 7,000 money mules and scammers suspected of involvement in scam cases were investigated in 2025 alone, more than 940 were charged, and more than 530 of those were charged under the amended Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes Act and the Computer Misuse Act.[^9] Under the Facility Restriction Framework, as at 9 February 2026, 550 money mules, 801 SIM card mules and 51 corporate entities had been placed under restrictions.[^9] GovTech investigated 32 suspicious Singpass accounts and saw six arrests tied to the illegal sale of Singpass accounts, and more than 4,600 financial accounts fraudulently created using Myinfo were terminated that year.[^9] ![A horizontal bar chart of Singapore Police Force enforcement in 2025 showing more than 7,000 money mules and scammers investigated, more than 940 charged and more than 530 charged under amended laws, each drawn as a reported minimum.](https://www.whatifmag.com/images/articles/the-mandate-needed-a-human/the-mandate-needed-a-human--fig2.png) **Figure 2.** The attrition between being investigated and being answerable, as taught in 2036 compliance courses. Every bar is a floor. The penalty is the tell. A mule who provides payment accounts, launders proceeds, or hands over SIM cards or Singpass credentials may be liable for caning of up to twelve strokes.[^9] A state does not reach for the cane over a filing error. It reaches for it when the cheapest way through a control is to buy a person, and it needs the person to cost more. So the lesson was on the table in 2026, written down, with figures attached. Require a named human behind a transaction and you create a price for named humans. The agent registry did not invent that market when it came. It formalised it. ## The loophole was never technical The chamber was careful about what an agent may do. It was quiet about who the human behind it has to be. Nothing in the principle requires the accountable person to be the beneficiary, or an employee, or anywhere near the decision. Compliance is satisfied by a name, and names are cheapest at the bottom. ![An empty government service centre waiting area after hours, rows of bolted plastic seats facing a dark counter and a ticket dispenser.](https://www.whatifmag.com/images/articles/the-mandate-needed-a-human/the-mandate-needed-a-human--fig3.png) **Figure 3.** The hearing rooms where mandate holders answer, outside sitting hours, 2036. Faizal reads perhaps a third of the mandates he accepts. The rest are renewals from firms he has carried for years, and the fee per mandate per month is small enough that two hundred and forty of them is the business. He is licensed, which puts him in the minority of people doing this. He sat the module, he knows the revocation procedure, he keeps a folder of every mandate he has ever withdrawn, and the folder is thick. One went wrong in 2034. An agent on a mandate he had not read in eleven months moved a freight booking through a counterparty that turned out to be three shells deep, and for five weeks Faizal was the only natural person named anywhere in it. He was not accused of anything. He answered. Answering was the job, and the job was done correctly, and it took five weeks of his life. His daughter works in compliance at a bank and will not do this work. She says [the rate is wrong for the risk](https://www.whatifmag.com/blog/the-form-was-the-regulation). She is right, and the rate is the rate. The question in 2036 is not whether you can verify an agent. You can, instantly, by key and by name and by the authority it carries, and the system that does it is genuinely excellent. The question is whether "someone who answers" was ever a safeguard or only a receipt. Singapore asked who was accountable, which was the right question, ten years before anybody else thought to ask it. It did not ask who could afford to be. The chime goes. Faizal reads three lines, taps once, and the agent goes off to do its work in his name. ## Author's Note This piece is speculative journalism written from the vantage of 2036. Faizal Omar is a fictional composite, and the 2036 mandate holder trade, its fees, licensing and hearings, is the author's extrapolation, not a sourced forecast. The November 2026 parliamentary exchange, the titles and quotations attributed to Tin Pei Ling and Jasmin Lau, the IMDA, GovTech and MAS initiatives, the governance framework, the Singpass figures and all police statistics are real and sourced below. One note on the record: the government supported the objectives of the registry proposal but did not commit to building one, and nothing here should be read as reporting that it did. Where the published accounts of the sitting differ in wording, the quotations here follow the version each outlet printed. ## Works Cited [^1]: Abdeen, Laili. "'Who answers for AI agents?' Singapore working on safeguards as adoption grows, says Jasmin Lau." AsiaOne, 4 November 2026. https://www.asiaone.com/singapore/ai-agents-trust-safeguards-jasmin-lau [^2]: Chee, Kenny. "S'pore exploring adapting web domain name system to track AI agents, need for national registry." The Straits Times, via Yahoo News Singapore, 4 November 2026. https://sg.news.yahoo.com/pore-exploring-adapting-domain-name-141905739.html [^3]: "Ms Jasmin LAU." Prime Minister's Office Singapore, last updated 13 August 2026. https://www.pmo.gov.sg/about-us/the-cabinet/ms-jasmin-lau/ [^4]: "Singapore Explores Using DNS to Identify AI Agents as It Weighs National Registry." ID Tech, 4 November 2026. https://idtechwire.com/singapore-explores-using-dns-to-identify-ai-agents-as-it-weighs-national-registry/ [^5]: Thian, Si Ying. "Singapore gears up to scale public sector's use of AI agents in later 2026." GovInsider. https://govinsider.asia/intl-en/article/singapore-gears-up-to-scale-public-sectors-use-of-ai-agents-in-later-2026 [^6]: "Updated Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI." Infocomm Media Development Authority, 20 May 2026. https://www.imda.gov.sg/resources/press-releases-factsheets-and-speeches/updated-model-ai-governance-framework-for-agentic-ai [^7]: "IMDA updates Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI." Allen & Gledhill, 30 July 2026. https://www.allenandgledhill.com/sg/publication/articles/33285/imda-updates-model-ai-governance-framework-for-agentic-ai [^8]: "Singpass Singapore's National Digital Identity (Factsheet)." Ministry of Digital Development and Information, 2 March 2022. https://www.mddi.gov.sg/newsroom/singpass-factsheet-02032022/ [^9]: "Annual Scam and Cybercrime Brief 2025." Public Affairs Department, Singapore Police Force, 25 February 2026. https://www.police.gov.sg/-/media/SPF/Media-Room/Statistics/Annual-Scams-and-Cybercrime-Brief-2025/Annual-Scam-and-Cybercrime-Brief-2025.pdf